<p>It is increasingly common in metanormative debates to distinguish between two kinds of normativity: formal normativity, which all norms have, and authoritative normativity, which is a significant force not all norms have. Yet, we lack a clear and neutral understanding of the concept of authoritative normativity. In this paper, I highlight and dispel common misconceptions that stand in the way of a careful debate. In particular, I argue that current discussions of authoritative normativity are shaped by the pervasive but unwarranted non-naturalist idea that authority must be an irreducibly normative and intrinsic property. This makes authoritative normativity seem more mysterious than it needs to be, fuelling normative scepticism. With demanding preconceptions out of the way, there is conceptual room for explaining the authority of norms with natural facts about agents or their commitments. I conclude that we must not dismiss metaphysically naturalist metanormative theories as mere theories of formal normativity.</p>