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<p>Daniel Russell has argued that virtue ethics requires a criterion for enumerating the virtues and suggests that reasons for action distinguish them (2009). This paper explores and defends Thomas Aquinas’s (ca. 1225–1274) view that virtues are distinguished by what makes us good in overcoming the difficulties we face. Aquinas’s account explains why agents can seemingly perform different virtuous actions for the same reasons while still satisfying the demands set by Russell for a theory of enumeration.</p>

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Aquinas on the Enumeration of the Virtues

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月14日

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  • Alexander Stöpfgeshoff

摘要

Daniel Russell has argued that virtue ethics requires a criterion for enumerating the virtues and suggests that reasons for action distinguish them (2009). This paper explores and defends Thomas Aquinas’s (ca. 1225–1274) view that virtues are distinguished by what makes us good in overcoming the difficulties we face. Aquinas’s account explains why agents can seemingly perform different virtuous actions for the same reasons while still satisfying the demands set by Russell for a theory of enumeration.