<p>I offer a reconstructive reading of Ṭūsī’s (1201–1274) account of natural goodness in the <i>Naserian Ethics.</i> I show that Ṭūsī’s version of Aristotelian ethics is especially well-suited to accommodate an intuition that is hard to integrate into a theory of natural goodness: Human good is nobler or more elevated than animal and vegetative goods. To do this, I analyze Ṭūsī’s discussion of the relationship between different kinds of perfection from non-living material compounds to vegetative, animal, human, and divine beings. I close by noting that, depending on our reading of Ṭūsī’s conception of divine beings and their perfection, his proposal might come at a cost to his Aristotelian naturalist ambitions for ethics.</p>

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Tusian Perfectionism

  • Reza Hadisi

摘要

I offer a reconstructive reading of Ṭūsī’s (1201–1274) account of natural goodness in the Naserian Ethics. I show that Ṭūsī’s version of Aristotelian ethics is especially well-suited to accommodate an intuition that is hard to integrate into a theory of natural goodness: Human good is nobler or more elevated than animal and vegetative goods. To do this, I analyze Ṭūsī’s discussion of the relationship between different kinds of perfection from non-living material compounds to vegetative, animal, human, and divine beings. I close by noting that, depending on our reading of Ṭūsī’s conception of divine beings and their perfection, his proposal might come at a cost to his Aristotelian naturalist ambitions for ethics.