<p>Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) attacks pose significant threats to the security of integrated circuits. With the advent of second-order attacks, memory storing sensitive data and codes has increasingly become primary target of EMFI attacks. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) under EMFI attacks. Specifically, we first design and conduct a physical EMFI attack experiment on a DRAM chip, based on which four fault models are constructed. Next, we investigate the generation and propagation mechanisms of faults in the DRAM memory array, and further validate the observed fault models through systematic analysis. Finally, two circuit-level countermeasures against EMFI attacks are proposed. Experimental results demonstrate that these countermeasures can effectively enhance DRAM’s resistance to EMFI. This study not only deepens the understanding of DRAM fault models under EMFI but also provides valuable guidance for the security-oriented design of DRAM against such attacks.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Fault Modeling and Countermeasures for DRAM–Targeted Electromagnetic Fault Injection

  • Qiang Liu,
  • Longtao Guo,
  • Xianzhao Xia,
  • Zhen Gao

摘要

Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) attacks pose significant threats to the security of integrated circuits. With the advent of second-order attacks, memory storing sensitive data and codes has increasingly become primary target of EMFI attacks. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) under EMFI attacks. Specifically, we first design and conduct a physical EMFI attack experiment on a DRAM chip, based on which four fault models are constructed. Next, we investigate the generation and propagation mechanisms of faults in the DRAM memory array, and further validate the observed fault models through systematic analysis. Finally, two circuit-level countermeasures against EMFI attacks are proposed. Experimental results demonstrate that these countermeasures can effectively enhance DRAM’s resistance to EMFI. This study not only deepens the understanding of DRAM fault models under EMFI but also provides valuable guidance for the security-oriented design of DRAM against such attacks.