<p>This study develops a game-theoretic model with two competing content platforms, to examine whether a platform should provide its first-party content exclusively or non-exclusively by licensing it to the rival platform, taking into consideration multi-homing users. Four market configurations are considered based on the following scenarios: both platforms provide their content exclusively (content exclusivity), both platforms license their content mutually (two-way content licensing), and only one platform licenses its content to the rival platform in exchange for a licensing fee (one-way content licensing). Our analysis reveals that when the platform provides its first-party content exclusively, it charges a higher price and obtains more subscribers than when it licenses content to the other platform. Meanwhile, the number of users that subscribe to both platforms is the lowest when both platforms license their first-party content to each other. We also find that when the licensing fee is low, content exclusivity is the market equilibrium; when the licensing fee is high, two-way content licensing is the market equilibrium, and a prisoner’s dilemma arises; when the licensing fee is moderate, one-way content licensing becomes the market equilibrium, where only the platform with the lower value of basic content licenses its content. Furthermore, we discover that platforms are less willing to license their content as platform competition intensifies or first-party content becomes more valuable. Finally, our findings show that consumer surplus is the highest when the platforms engage in two-way content licensing and the lowest when they provide their first-party content exclusively.</p>