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<p>This paper studies optimal income taxation when women face statistical discrimination in the labor market due to employers’ beliefs about domestic responsibilities. Under imperfect information, wages are endogenously determined and reflect not only individual qualification but also group specific expectations about home production, leading women to earn lower wages than men with the same qualification. As a result, observed earnings become an imperfect proxy for underlying qualification: at a given wage level, women are more qualified than men and optimally allocate less time to market work and more time to home production. This wedge weakens the mapping between earnings and qualification and implies that optimal non-linear income taxation may differ across genders.</p>

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Gender-based taxation and statistical discrimination

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月26日

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  • Jeanne Poulain

摘要

This paper studies optimal income taxation when women face statistical discrimination in the labor market due to employers’ beliefs about domestic responsibilities. Under imperfect information, wages are endogenously determined and reflect not only individual qualification but also group specific expectations about home production, leading women to earn lower wages than men with the same qualification. As a result, observed earnings become an imperfect proxy for underlying qualification: at a given wage level, women are more qualified than men and optimally allocate less time to market work and more time to home production. This wedge weakens the mapping between earnings and qualification and implies that optimal non-linear income taxation may differ across genders.