<p>Do jurisdictions that rely on grants from the central government give more electoral support to the national ruling party? Exploring a quasi-exogenous variation around population thresholds that discontinuously distribute the Municipalities’ Participation Fund (FPM) in Brazil, we find that greater fiscal dependence—measured as the FPM share in the local budget—benefits the incumbent president’s party. Hence, the FPM share positively impacts the results for the ruling party in presidential and congressional elections (elasticities of 0.05% and 0.2%). Fiscal dependence also expands local bureaucracies relative to the private sector (roughly 0.2–0.4%), increasing the capacity of local politicians to influence the local electorate. The mayoral candidates of the president’s party lose votes (0.4%), suggesting that local politicians prefer to remain neutral to access alternative sources of grants, such as from state governments and opposition lawmakers. We find less robust evidence of FPM effects on congressional budget amendments and on local GDP growth. Our results highlight how structural fiscal reliance, not just targeted pork-barrel spending or ideology, drives political alignment.</p>