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<p>It is controversial what role (if any) the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s practical agency plays in explaining why paternalism is wrong. In this paper I argue that this belief plays a significant role when and only when it falsely underestimates the excellence of the recipient’s agency. Holding such a belief constitutes a morally objectionable failure of whatDarwall (1977) calls <i>appraisal respect</i>. Treating someone paternalistically on this basis is wrong because it legitimizes this objectionable appraisal and harms the recipient by preventing them from acting prudently. While this epistemic aspect of paternalism does not explain why all instances of paternalism are wrong, it does (at least partly) explain why all instances of a certain <i>kind</i> of paternalism – what I call <i>false-belief paternalism</i> – are wrong.</p>

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False-Belief Paternalism

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月17日

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  • Stephanie Sheintul

摘要

It is controversial what role (if any) the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s practical agency plays in explaining why paternalism is wrong. In this paper I argue that this belief plays a significant role when and only when it falsely underestimates the excellence of the recipient’s agency. Holding such a belief constitutes a morally objectionable failure of whatDarwall (1977) calls appraisal respect. Treating someone paternalistically on this basis is wrong because it legitimizes this objectionable appraisal and harms the recipient by preventing them from acting prudently. While this epistemic aspect of paternalism does not explain why all instances of paternalism are wrong, it does (at least partly) explain why all instances of a certain kind of paternalism – what I call false-belief paternalism – are wrong.