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<p>This comment discusses the relation between Samuel Scheffler’s ‘attachment-sensitive conception’ – as introduced in <i>One Life to Lead</i>&#xa0;– and morality more generally. It discusses whether the attachment-sensitive conception implies a dichotomy between personal and impersonal reasons and assesses whether positing the attachment-sensitive conception may be compatible with affirming a detached consequentialist theory for the impersonal, moral realm. Finally, it suggests – very tentatively – that the notions of valuing and deference that, following Scheffler, underpin our personal reasons, could also be what underpins our impersonal reasons: Both personal and impersonal reasons may have their normative source in what it means to value and defer to those around us – loved ones and strangers alike.</p>

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Morality and Attachment-Sensitivity

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月13日

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  • Jessica J. T. Fischer

摘要

This comment discusses the relation between Samuel Scheffler’s ‘attachment-sensitive conception’ – as introduced in One Life to Lead – and morality more generally. It discusses whether the attachment-sensitive conception implies a dichotomy between personal and impersonal reasons and assesses whether positing the attachment-sensitive conception may be compatible with affirming a detached consequentialist theory for the impersonal, moral realm. Finally, it suggests – very tentatively – that the notions of valuing and deference that, following Scheffler, underpin our personal reasons, could also be what underpins our impersonal reasons: Both personal and impersonal reasons may have their normative source in what it means to value and defer to those around us – loved ones and strangers alike.