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<p>Some philosophers who are sceptical about the value of culture have contended that cultural practices that involve animal cruelty are not morally justified. To forward this position, these philosophers offer arguments grounded in intuition, harm, comparative weight and equality. They contend that cultural practices involving animal harm can be shown to be morally wrong simply by relying on a weak perspective that we should not harm others unnecessarily. In this article, I argue that this weak perspective on animals’ interests is insufficient to prescribe minority practices that involve animal cruelty as more morally relevant than the interest in culture. For their argument to be cogent, these philosophers need to rely on stronger assumptions. I then conclude by suggesting a path for debate that involves taking the claims of cultural groups seriously.</p>

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On Animal Cruelty in Cultural Practices: Toward an Ethic of Humility and the Avowal of Difference

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月3日

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  • Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues

摘要

Some philosophers who are sceptical about the value of culture have contended that cultural practices that involve animal cruelty are not morally justified. To forward this position, these philosophers offer arguments grounded in intuition, harm, comparative weight and equality. They contend that cultural practices involving animal harm can be shown to be morally wrong simply by relying on a weak perspective that we should not harm others unnecessarily. In this article, I argue that this weak perspective on animals’ interests is insufficient to prescribe minority practices that involve animal cruelty as more morally relevant than the interest in culture. For their argument to be cogent, these philosophers need to rely on stronger assumptions. I then conclude by suggesting a path for debate that involves taking the claims of cultural groups seriously.