<p>This paper examines a position within the ethics of human extinction called “pro-extinctionism.” It argues that there are many ways one could interpret this thesis. After exploring these possibilities, I critically examine a number of arguments in favor of pro-extinctionist views that aim for final human extinction, i.e., the extinction of our species such that we do not leave behind any successors. Such arguments are based on philosophical pessimism, empirical pessimism, antinatalism, radical environmentalism, negative utilitarianism, and misanthropy. I then turn to various arguments for terminal extinction without final extinction, i.e., the extinction of our species through replacement with a posthuman species. These are based on notions of cosmic evolution, maximization, and posthuman supremacy. I then examine a related idea called “extinction neutralism,” whereby the survival of our species into the posthuman era is a matter of moral indifference. I claim that extinction neutralism would likely entail pro-extinctionism in practice. My hope is that this paper offers some useful clarity to an increasingly urgent question: should our species die out in the near future?</p>