<p>Zagzebski’s book <i>Exemplarist Moral Theory</i> is an admirable text, and a rich source of inspiration and reflection on both moral theory and morality. My aim in this paper, however, has been mainly critical. I develop three remarks about what I take to be contentious or problematic aspects of Zagzebski’s work. The first is a likely exposure to moral relativism, derived from the variety of attitudes and judgments about exemplarity and its representatives across different cultures and social groups. The second has to do with problems associated with the central role of admiration in Zagzebski’s exemplarism, because of the unequal and asymmetric relation among admiring and admired agents that this emotion typically gives rise to. My third remark concerns the important theoretical role that direct reference semantics plays in Zagzebski’s theory. I argue that, regarding moral terms, we simply lack the intuitions that lead us to accept a theory of direct reference in connection with, e.g., natural kind terms. It is implausible to hold that moral properties have a hidden nature or essence, which science might be able to discover. The meaning of moral language, I suggest, is predominantly functional.</p>