<p>This paper examines Plato’s moral exemplarism, arguing that admiration plays a central role in his moral philosophy. It does so by linking Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as an object of moral admiration with his account of the psychology of moral imitation—particularly as developed in the depiction of Socrates across the dialogues and in the psychological framework of the Republic. The study responds to the growing interest in exemplarist moral theory by addressing the relative neglect of Plato’s contribution to this tradition. A parallel objective of this paper is to foster dialogue between Plato’s account of moral exemplarism and Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory, highlighting points of convergence in their approaches to admiration and moral motivation. The first part of the paper underscores the ambivalence of admiration in Plato’s dialogues, analyzing <i>Apology</i>, <i>Crito</i>, <i>Phaedo</i>, <i>Laches</i>, and <i>Symposium</i> to show how Plato constructs Socrates as a moral exemplar while simultaneously revealing admiration’s limitations as a consistent driver of moral transformation. The second part focuses on the <i>Republic</i>, where Plato provides a systematic psychological framework for admiration, particularly through the analysis of the spirited part of the soul (<i>thymos</i>) and its role in moral education. This analysis helps resolve the tensions present in Plato’s earlier treatment of admiration by arguing that rational reflection can internally refine and enhance admiration, enabling it to fulfill its distinctive role in the development of moral virtue. By integrating emotional and rational elements in moral formation, Plato’s account offers a historically grounded perspective on contemporary debates regarding the role of admiration in morality.</p>