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<p>Previous scholars agree that the two truths, i.e., <i>saṃvṛtisatya</i> and <i>paramārthasatya</i>, in the <i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> and the <i>Nyāyānusāra</i> are not only semantic and epistemological but also ontological, as the two truths can also refer to different types of existents (<i>saṃvṛtisat</i> and <i>paramārthasat</i>, respectively). Through examining the definitions of the two truths in Sarvāstivāda texts and related Abhidharma works preceding the <i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> and the <i>Nyāyānusāra</i>, this paper argues that the equalization of <i>satya</i> and <i>sat</i> has a two-phase history in the Sarvāstivāda tradition. In the first phase, as presented in earlier versions of the <i>Vibhāṣā</i>, the idea of corresponding types of existents had not emerged in the context of two truths. In the second phase, as presented in the latest version of the <i>Vibhāṣā</i>, <i>*Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya</i>, *<i>Tattvasiddhi</i>, and Śrīlāta’s view cited in the <i>Nyāyānusāra</i>, the two truths are increasingly identified with two types of existents; and then, in the <i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> and the <i>Nyāyānusāra</i>, the two truths and the two types of existents become completely interchangeable, both philosophically and terminologically. This paper further suggests that the equivalence between <i>satya</i> and <i>sat</i> in the later phase may relate to the intent of demonstrating existence through cognitive activities and to the nomenclature tradition of treating causes and effects as interchangeable in the Sarvāstivāda tradition.</p>

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The Move from “What is True” to “What Exists”: An Examination of Two Truths (satya) and Existents (sat) in Sarvāstivāda Texts

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月27日

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  • Xueni Lin

摘要

Previous scholars agree that the two truths, i.e., saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Nyāyānusāra are not only semantic and epistemological but also ontological, as the two truths can also refer to different types of existents (saṃvṛtisat and paramārthasat, respectively). Through examining the definitions of the two truths in Sarvāstivāda texts and related Abhidharma works preceding the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Nyāyānusāra, this paper argues that the equalization of satya and sat has a two-phase history in the Sarvāstivāda tradition. In the first phase, as presented in earlier versions of the Vibhāṣā, the idea of corresponding types of existents had not emerged in the context of two truths. In the second phase, as presented in the latest version of the Vibhāṣā, *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, *Tattvasiddhi, and Śrīlāta’s view cited in the Nyāyānusāra, the two truths are increasingly identified with two types of existents; and then, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Nyāyānusāra, the two truths and the two types of existents become completely interchangeable, both philosophically and terminologically. This paper further suggests that the equivalence between satya and sat in the later phase may relate to the intent of demonstrating existence through cognitive activities and to the nomenclature tradition of treating causes and effects as interchangeable in the Sarvāstivāda tradition.