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<p> <?sps A3B2 twb=".27w?"?> <?sps A3B2 tlsb="-.01w?"?>In this study, I attempt to reexamine Dignāga’s <i>apoha</i> theory through the lens of semantic deference. The present paper consists of two main parts. In the first part, I will demonstrate that based on PS(V) 5.25−30 and PS(V) 5.34, Dignāga’s <i>apoha</i> theory should be counted as a social externalist theory of reference. I will also explain how this makes him very contrasting to a group of Apohavādins represented by Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, whose theories have a strongly individualistic character. Then, in the second part, I will first elucidate how Dignāga’s account of the use of words supports the idea of semantic deference and explains the phenomenon of imperfect mastery—viz., a speaker can competently use a word to refer to things without fully mastering that word. Then, I will illustrate how PS(V) 5.34 and PS(V) 5.50b represent two different traditions about semantic deference in the history of philosophy. And finally, there will be a brief discussion of the problem of ungroundedness in Dignāga’s <i>apoha</i> theory as presented in PS(V) 5.34.</p>

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Social Externalism and Semantic Deference: A Reexamination of Dignāga’s Apoha Theory

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月30日

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  • Long Yin Sin

摘要

In this study, I attempt to reexamine Dignāga’s apoha theory through the lens of semantic deference. The present paper consists of two main parts. In the first part, I will demonstrate that based on PS(V) 5.25−30 and PS(V) 5.34, Dignāga’s apoha theory should be counted as a social externalist theory of reference. I will also explain how this makes him very contrasting to a group of Apohavādins represented by Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, whose theories have a strongly individualistic character. Then, in the second part, I will first elucidate how Dignāga’s account of the use of words supports the idea of semantic deference and explains the phenomenon of imperfect mastery—viz., a speaker can competently use a word to refer to things without fully mastering that word. Then, I will illustrate how PS(V) 5.34 and PS(V) 5.50b represent two different traditions about semantic deference in the history of philosophy. And finally, there will be a brief discussion of the problem of ungroundedness in Dignāga’s apoha theory as presented in PS(V) 5.34.