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<p>Nāgārjuna claims that the ultimate reality must be taught through reliance on customary ways of talking and thinking (<i>vyavahāra</i>) which do not express it. What property could some specific <i>vyavahāra</i>&#xa0;possess, if not truth, which would have it reliably teach people the ultimate reality? Nāgārjuna does not tell us, and a lack of a satisfactory answer may undermine the coherence of his thought. I attempt to resolve this issue by proposing a form of structural correspondence between language and reality which I think is consistent with Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. This relies on arguing that reports of experiences are truth-valued even if ontological claims never are, and that the truthmaker of experience reports is reality (<i>tattva</i>), not just hypostatization (<i>prapañca</i>). </p>

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Nāgārjuna and the Structure of Reality

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月23日

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  • Justin P. Holder

摘要

Nāgārjuna claims that the ultimate reality must be taught through reliance on customary ways of talking and thinking (vyavahāra) which do not express it. What property could some specific vyavahāra possess, if not truth, which would have it reliably teach people the ultimate reality? Nāgārjuna does not tell us, and a lack of a satisfactory answer may undermine the coherence of his thought. I attempt to resolve this issue by proposing a form of structural correspondence between language and reality which I think is consistent with Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. This relies on arguing that reports of experiences are truth-valued even if ontological claims never are, and that the truthmaker of experience reports is reality (tattva), not just hypostatization (prapañca).