<p>This essay is an attempt to evaluate the concept of non-duality (<i>advaita</i>) in the philosophy of Abhinavagupta (<i>fl. c.</i> 975–1025 CE), one of the leading exponents of Trika Śaivism, who argues for ‘absolute non-duality’ (<i>paramādvaita</i>) as a fundamental principle of everything. According to him, this fundamental meta-category subsumes within itself both ‘duality’ (<i>dvaita</i> or <i>bheda</i>) and ‘non-duality’ (<i>advaita</i> or <i>abheda</i>) in a resolution that, on the surface, appears to be nothing more than an oxymoron. How can two mutually opposing categories be one? However, for Abhinavagupta, both ‘duality’ and ‘non-duality’ are the basic building blocks of an all-encompassing singular meta-category called ‘absolute non-duality’ (<i>paramādvaita</i>). This version of non-duality argues for inclusivism, i.e., for any idea of binary to manifest, someone fundamentally recognises the distinction between, for instance, a ‘pot’ (<i>ghaṭa</i>) and a ‘non-pot’ (<i>aghaṭa</i>) and it is this distinction (<i>dvaita</i> or <i>bheda</i>) that unitarily brings a pot and a non-pot together (<i>advaita</i> or <i>abheda</i>). By saying this, Abhinavagupta is not suggesting that a pot is a non-pot and a non-pot is a pot. But they are singular manifestations in a plural form <i>of</i> and <i>in</i> a singular principle, i.e., non-dual consciousness (<i>advaitasamvit</i>). Using a more contemporary terminology, this form of non-duality may be called ‘pluralistic non-dualism’ or ‘subjective pluralism’, understood in the sense that even two mutually opposing labels, such as ‘pluralistic idealism’ or ‘idealistic realism’, can be used.</p>

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What Does Abhinavagupta Mean by ‘Non-duality’ (advaita)?

  • Mrinal Kaul

摘要

This essay is an attempt to evaluate the concept of non-duality (advaita) in the philosophy of Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 CE), one of the leading exponents of Trika Śaivism, who argues for ‘absolute non-duality’ (paramādvaita) as a fundamental principle of everything. According to him, this fundamental meta-category subsumes within itself both ‘duality’ (dvaita or bheda) and ‘non-duality’ (advaita or abheda) in a resolution that, on the surface, appears to be nothing more than an oxymoron. How can two mutually opposing categories be one? However, for Abhinavagupta, both ‘duality’ and ‘non-duality’ are the basic building blocks of an all-encompassing singular meta-category called ‘absolute non-duality’ (paramādvaita). This version of non-duality argues for inclusivism, i.e., for any idea of binary to manifest, someone fundamentally recognises the distinction between, for instance, a ‘pot’ (ghaṭa) and a ‘non-pot’ (aghaṭa) and it is this distinction (dvaita or bheda) that unitarily brings a pot and a non-pot together (advaita or abheda). By saying this, Abhinavagupta is not suggesting that a pot is a non-pot and a non-pot is a pot. But they are singular manifestations in a plural form of and in a singular principle, i.e., non-dual consciousness (advaitasamvit). Using a more contemporary terminology, this form of non-duality may be called ‘pluralistic non-dualism’ or ‘subjective pluralism’, understood in the sense that even two mutually opposing labels, such as ‘pluralistic idealism’ or ‘idealistic realism’, can be used.