<p>Schutz’s methodological postulates are among the most important topics in his work as a whole. From his earlier to his later writings, he argues that social science needs these postulates to produce adequate and reliable knowledge of the everyday social life-world. The ambiguities found in his formulations have led various scholars to criticize these postulates for being impossible, or for leading social science into paradoxes. This essay argues that these problems dissipate or appear under a different aspect when we take into account his epistemological insights and definition of “knowledge”; his conception of social science as oriented toward everyday “experience” in the common-sense life-world; and his understanding of the world of social scientific theory as one among many realities or “finite provinces of meaning”. After a review of Schutz’s way of thematizing everyday experience and his attempt to found social science on phenomenological insights, the essay shows how Schutz’s methodological postulates for social science draw on the positive implications of the paradoxical relation of social scientific knowledge to commonsense knowledge.</p>