<p>Morden collective assets fosters the innovative governance solutions, which might not emerge within the secluded boundaries of a single organization. This study employs a case study in China’s rapid urbanisation zone to construct a tripartite game paradigm for urban village restructuring. Considering the complexity of the social transformation of urban villages in the new governance context, the game introduces the management perspective of rural shareholding cooperatives (RSCs) into the tripartite partnership. The dynamic evolution results show that a reasonable reward mechanism and local government can effectively mobilise the enthusiasm of shareholders in RSCs. Interesting reward and punishment mechanism can enable RSCs and local governments to actively coordinate shareholders, thus informing the stakeholder-oriented economic framework by elucidating the connections among principal participants. This study analyse the post rural governance issues of collective asset and stakeholder differentiation, identifying the major concern of actual “social effects”. The results provide valuable insights that can be of benefit to lawmakers, regulators and executives responsible for analysing and assessing collective asset operation efficiency, with more practical implications and future prospects for rural governance and urban villages.</p>