<p>This paper critically examines the claim that Edmund Husserl is an anti-volitionist, as argued by Andrea Staiti and Nicola Spano, who suggest that Husserl rejects volitionism and instead characterizes volition as an extensional property of action. While acknowledging the textual evidence supporting this view, the paper presents a close reading of S<i>tudien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins</i> and related manuscripts to demonstrate that Husserl’s text also supports a volitionist conception of action. The paper argues that Husserl’s volitionalist approach synthesizes elements of identity theory, externalism, and internalism, illustrating that Husserl’s account of action integrates both the initiating and sustaining dimensions of volition within a dynamic, stratified structure of complete action. Drawing on Husserl’s nuanced distinctions between decision-will and <i>fiat</i>-will, as well as his analysis of primary and secondary actions, the paper proposes a “dual-will volitionism” as a more coherent interpretive framework.</p>