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<p>On the received view, Husserl’s theory of feeling is interpreted as primarily cognitivist, because he holds that feeling intentionality is essentially furnished by founding presentative perception. Husserl situates feelings as relatively high-level act, and he faces two severe critiques: first, he cannot do justice to the <i>sui generis</i> kind of intentionality in existential feelings as articulated in Heidegger’s <i>Being and Time</i>, which are not founded upon objectifying act but instead genetically precedes and grounds such objectification; and second, he fails to adequately address the role of pre-thematic feelings in structuring epistemic access, given that existential feelings such as anxiety are world-directed rather than object-directed. In this paper, I challenge this received view by demonstrating that Husserl develops a robust theory of affective intentionality (<i>Gemütsintention</i>) with a focus on his manuscripts in <i>Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins</i>. I argue that Husserl offers a comprehensive account of pre-thematic feelings and their role as an affective ground for thematic cognition. I further articulate a peculiar kind of twofold intentionality in Husserl’s theory of affective feeling and show how this passive form of feeling intentionality constitutes a primordial contact with the world. Contra Heidegger, I contend that Husserl’s account offers a more elucidating explanation of how affective feelings establish epistemic grounding, bridging the pre-thematic and thematic layers of experience.</p>

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Affect and Feeling Intentionality: From Husserl to Heidegger and Back

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月15日

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  • Zhida Luo

摘要

On the received view, Husserl’s theory of feeling is interpreted as primarily cognitivist, because he holds that feeling intentionality is essentially furnished by founding presentative perception. Husserl situates feelings as relatively high-level act, and he faces two severe critiques: first, he cannot do justice to the sui generis kind of intentionality in existential feelings as articulated in Heidegger’s Being and Time, which are not founded upon objectifying act but instead genetically precedes and grounds such objectification; and second, he fails to adequately address the role of pre-thematic feelings in structuring epistemic access, given that existential feelings such as anxiety are world-directed rather than object-directed. In this paper, I challenge this received view by demonstrating that Husserl develops a robust theory of affective intentionality (Gemütsintention) with a focus on his manuscripts in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I argue that Husserl offers a comprehensive account of pre-thematic feelings and their role as an affective ground for thematic cognition. I further articulate a peculiar kind of twofold intentionality in Husserl’s theory of affective feeling and show how this passive form of feeling intentionality constitutes a primordial contact with the world. Contra Heidegger, I contend that Husserl’s account offers a more elucidating explanation of how affective feelings establish epistemic grounding, bridging the pre-thematic and thematic layers of experience.