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<p>The controversy between Edmund Husserl and Moritz Schlick played a significant role in forging divisions between the phenomenological tradition and analytic philosophy. While Schlick systematically criticised multiple facets of Husserl’s outlook from 1910 onwards, Husserl’s brief response in the 1921 foreword to his <i>Logische Untersuchungen</i> was highly polemical. Given that he does not address Schlick’s criticisms in detail, scholarship has hitherto focussed primarily on defending Husserl’s position. In many such cases, Schlick’s position has been misconstrued, primarily because his earliest and most detailed response to Husserl has not been taken into account. This paper reconstructs Schlick’s overall argumentative strategy from his entry into the <i>Psychologismusstreit</i> in 1910, up to his response to Husserl in the second edition of <i>Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre</i> in 1925. Schlick’s critique of Husserl begins with his early onslaught against the ‘independence theory’ of truth, which is then gradually connected to his overall critique of intuition. Any defence of Husserl from Schlick’s objections is best undertaken in light of this overall argumentative strategy.</p>

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Reconsidering Schlick’s Critique of Husserl

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月14日

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  • Andreas Vrahimis

摘要

The controversy between Edmund Husserl and Moritz Schlick played a significant role in forging divisions between the phenomenological tradition and analytic philosophy. While Schlick systematically criticised multiple facets of Husserl’s outlook from 1910 onwards, Husserl’s brief response in the 1921 foreword to his Logische Untersuchungen was highly polemical. Given that he does not address Schlick’s criticisms in detail, scholarship has hitherto focussed primarily on defending Husserl’s position. In many such cases, Schlick’s position has been misconstrued, primarily because his earliest and most detailed response to Husserl has not been taken into account. This paper reconstructs Schlick’s overall argumentative strategy from his entry into the Psychologismusstreit in 1910, up to his response to Husserl in the second edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in 1925. Schlick’s critique of Husserl begins with his early onslaught against the ‘independence theory’ of truth, which is then gradually connected to his overall critique of intuition. Any defence of Husserl from Schlick’s objections is best undertaken in light of this overall argumentative strategy.