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<p>Resolving national-level conflicts is of critical importance as such conflicts may deeply affect the lives of millions; accordingly, mediation aimed at ending such disputes and making peace is essential. This study investigates methods for resolving such conflicts applying the inverse graph model. Being an NP-hard problem, it rapidly loses efficiency as the number of feasible states increases. The primary innovation of this research is the introduction of a novel approach to zero–one mathematical modeling for multiple simultaneous games incorporating player weights to address larger-sized problems. The developed approach is based on decomposing the conflict into its constituent sub-conflicts, incorporating the interactions between sub-conflicts as constraints in the mathematical model. A set of candidate equilibria for peace-building is first introduced. Then, a single candidate equilibrium is innovatively pinpointed as the desired equilibrium, along with simultaneous and integrated determination of optimal preferences. Seeking for balanced solutions and lasting peace, the model is designed to minimize the maximum cumulative change in player preferences. Moreover, Analytic Hierarchy Process is utilized to extract player weights from expert opinions. Eventually, the proposed approach is applied to Camp David 2000 negotiations. Results demonstrate how USA could have played a more effective third-party role in making peace.</p>

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Simultaneous Games in Inverse Graph Model: A Mathematical Approach to Peace-Building Applied to Camp David II

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月9日

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  • Bagher Hasani Keleshteri,
  • Reza Baradaran Kazemzadeh,
  • Majid Sheikhmohammady

摘要

Resolving national-level conflicts is of critical importance as such conflicts may deeply affect the lives of millions; accordingly, mediation aimed at ending such disputes and making peace is essential. This study investigates methods for resolving such conflicts applying the inverse graph model. Being an NP-hard problem, it rapidly loses efficiency as the number of feasible states increases. The primary innovation of this research is the introduction of a novel approach to zero–one mathematical modeling for multiple simultaneous games incorporating player weights to address larger-sized problems. The developed approach is based on decomposing the conflict into its constituent sub-conflicts, incorporating the interactions between sub-conflicts as constraints in the mathematical model. A set of candidate equilibria for peace-building is first introduced. Then, a single candidate equilibrium is innovatively pinpointed as the desired equilibrium, along with simultaneous and integrated determination of optimal preferences. Seeking for balanced solutions and lasting peace, the model is designed to minimize the maximum cumulative change in player preferences. Moreover, Analytic Hierarchy Process is utilized to extract player weights from expert opinions. Eventually, the proposed approach is applied to Camp David 2000 negotiations. Results demonstrate how USA could have played a more effective third-party role in making peace.