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<p>In this paper, we extend preference-approval structures to a more general situation, where voters can sort the alternatives in three disjoint classes instead of two (for instance, acceptable, neutral and unacceptable). We propose a parameterized family of voting systems related to the Borda count, where positive (negative) individual scores are assigned to acceptable (unacceptable) alternatives in a decreasing way from best to worst, while neutral alternatives obtain null scores. We analyze the role of parameters and provide some properties that satisfy the proposed voting systems.</p>

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Combining the Borda Count with Approval and Disapproval Voting

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月31日

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  • José Luis García-Lapresta,
  • Miguel Martínez-Panero

摘要

In this paper, we extend preference-approval structures to a more general situation, where voters can sort the alternatives in three disjoint classes instead of two (for instance, acceptable, neutral and unacceptable). We propose a parameterized family of voting systems related to the Borda count, where positive (negative) individual scores are assigned to acceptable (unacceptable) alternatives in a decreasing way from best to worst, while neutral alternatives obtain null scores. We analyze the role of parameters and provide some properties that satisfy the proposed voting systems.