<p>This paper investigates a single-period inventory model in which a monopolist firm sells one type of product with a short life cycle over two stages within a selling season. The firm is loss-averse and faces random supply capacity, aiming to maximize its revenue by determining the optimal order quantity and selling price. Customers behave strategically by making timely purchases to maximize their individual surplus. We carry out an extensive analysis of the inventory model from the perspective of prospect theory. It is revealed that random supply capacity does not affect the firm’s optimal order quantity, even in the presence of strategic customer behavior (SCB). We prove that the optimal order quantity of the loss-averse firm is less than that of a loss-neutral firm with SCB, and is also less than that of the optimal order quantity in the classical model without SCB. Furthermore, the optimal selling price varies depending on different scenarios. Under a random supply capacity, the optimal selling price of the loss-averse firm is higher than that of the loss-neutral firm, yet lower than that in the classical model without SCB. Moreover, as the level of loss aversion increases, the loss-averse firm reduces its order quantity and raises the selling price. Finally, we study the impact of key system parameters on the optimal order quantity and selling price, and conduct numerical experiments to demonstrate the theoretical results.</p>