<p>Is critique an intellectual operation or an ethical–political practice? Do we ‘choose’ subjectively to critique? What about deconstruction? Is it another tool for critical operations? In the legal realm, deconstruction is often associated with critical legal theory. Following the rise of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in the United States, Derrida’s deconstruction became a tool for Critical lawyers. However, Drucilla Cornell fundamentally criticised this approach, arguing that CLS neglects the ethical dimensions of deconstruction, reducing it to a mere instrument devoid of ethical consideration. She contended that deconstruction is distinct from the critique envisioned by CLS, positioning it outside CLS’s theoretical framework. Given this theoretical clash, this paper will explore the relationship between ethics, critique, and deconstruction. It aims to determine whether critique needs ethics, and how the ethical dimensions of deconstruction might transform the prevailing notion of critique and judgment within legal scholarship. To do this, the paper will first examine the differences between CLS and Cornell’s interpretation of Derrida. Subsequently, it will highlight the theoretical distinctions between Cornell's deconstruction and critique. It will argue that Cornell’s understanding of deconstruction makes legal deconstruction significantly different from legal critique. Furthermore, the paper will propose that Cornell’s deconstruction as ‘philosophy of the limit’ closely aligns with the Foucauldian concept of critical ethos and provides a theoretical basis that fundamentally changes the logic of critique and judgment in the legal realm.</p>