Immigration Detention: the Case for Contingent Abolitionism
摘要
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the moral status of immigration detention. It begins by explaining that one of the wrong-making features of the practice of immigration detention is that it is a prima facie infringement of the right to not be detained. It proceeds to ask whether, in light of this wrong-making feature, the practice of immigration detention can be justified. First: this paper considers and rejects a series of arguments that attempt to morally justify the practice of immigration detention. Second: it develops a novel argument relating to risk management. The essence of this argument is that it is all-things-considered morally permissible to detain a migrant in immigration detention if they pose a serious risk of harm that cannot otherwise be feasibly mitigated. This paper concludes by explaining that the conditions under which this justification can be given are not normally satisfied in the actual world. And this, or so it is argued, ought to motivate us to become ‘contingent abolitionists’ in regard to the practice of immigration detention.