<p>In this paper, we discuss a concern about moral testimony in the context of clinical ethics consultation. We argue that deference to moral testimony complicates the notion of moral answerability. By moral answerability, we mean roughly the notion of being the appropriate target for demands for moral justification regarding a belief or action and being eligible for a variety of moral responses. In cases of deference to moral testimony, it is unclear whether it is the testifier or the deferring agent who is morally answerable for the testimony-based belief and any requisite action performed on the basis of said belief. We discuss the implications of this idea for the practice of clinical ethics consultation. We explore whether the ethicist or the consultee is answerable for beliefs formed and actions performed as outcomes of the consultation. We outline the various considerations for holding each party answerable and ultimately propose a joint answerability account according to which both the ethicist and the consultee are answerable for moral responses, but to different degrees depending on the context.</p>