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<p>Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have&#xa0;garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis&#xa0;Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes.&#xa0;Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further&#xa0;advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI.&#xa0;However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular&#xa0;media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg&#xa0;argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite&#xa0;extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has&#xa0;received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this&#xa0;imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments&#xa0;against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument&#xa0;from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By&#xa0;systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to&#xa0;provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research&#xa0;on AI.</p>

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Examining popular arguments against AI existential risk: a philosophical analysis

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月25日

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  • Torben Swoboda,
  • Risto Uuk,
  • Lode Lauwaert,
  • Andrew P. Rebera,
  • Ann-Katrien Oimann,
  • Bartlomiej Chomanski,
  • Carina Prunkl

摘要

Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.