<p>Respect has played an important role in both contemporary and historical accounts of non-consequentialism. Nonetheless, there remain few analyses or definitions of respect, especially of a sort that might underwrite respect’s role in non-consequentialist explanation. I aim to provide such a definition of respect here, by accounting for respect in terms of normative fittingness. A fit-based definition of respect avoids counterexamples to definitions of respect cashed out in terms of other normative features, such as ought, obligation and sufficient reason. Most notably, the fit-based definition of respect can be adapted into a defensible account of <i>recognition</i> respect, the most normatively significant kind of respect. The resulting definition of recognition respect can provide informative non-consequentialist explanations of moral and epistemic obligations. This in turn allows the non-consequentialist to avoid taking non-consequentialism’s first-order commitments to be brute.</p>