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<p>I describe an argument that is thought to be important for deciding between competing theories of propositions. It is used to argue against coarse-grained propositions and for fine-grained propositions. It relies on <i>independence of belief</i>: for any propositions P and Q, if P and Q are distinct, it is possible to believe P and not believe Q. Independence of belief is controversial, and might reasonably be doubted. I give reasons for doubting it, and for doubting its usefulness in debates about propositions. Independence of belief is, therefore, unsuitable for supporting the argument. I also give reasons for thinking that it is not easy to amend independence of belief so that the amended claim can be used to support the argument. I conclude that the argument is less useful than it seems.</p>

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Independence of Belief

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月27日

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  • Thomas Hodgson

摘要

I describe an argument that is thought to be important for deciding between competing theories of propositions. It is used to argue against coarse-grained propositions and for fine-grained propositions. It relies on independence of belief: for any propositions P and Q, if P and Q are distinct, it is possible to believe P and not believe Q. Independence of belief is controversial, and might reasonably be doubted. I give reasons for doubting it, and for doubting its usefulness in debates about propositions. Independence of belief is, therefore, unsuitable for supporting the argument. I also give reasons for thinking that it is not easy to amend independence of belief so that the amended claim can be used to support the argument. I conclude that the argument is less useful than it seems.