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<p>This paper answers an objection to metaethical contextualism. Contextualism is the view that moral claims involve reference to standards or ends determined by context. The problem is that contextualism entails that certain moral claims are trivially true, which is contrary to appearances. I develop an account of semantic competence with moral terms that explains why it is not obvious to speakers that moral claims are indexed to standards or ends. This masks the trivial nature of the relevant moral claims.</p>

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Metaethical Contextualism, Triviality and Semantic Blindness

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月20日

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  • Daan Evers

摘要

This paper answers an objection to metaethical contextualism. Contextualism is the view that moral claims involve reference to standards or ends determined by context. The problem is that contextualism entails that certain moral claims are trivially true, which is contrary to appearances. I develop an account of semantic competence with moral terms that explains why it is not obvious to speakers that moral claims are indexed to standards or ends. This masks the trivial nature of the relevant moral claims.