<p>What is the nature of moral accountability? And what does an answer to this question reveal about the correct moral theory? This paper defends the view that moral accountability is inherently relational or bipolar in nature. It does so by seeking to understand a central accountability practice—<i>sincere apology</i>. The paper begins by considering a challenge to a relational or bipolar view of morality, according to which such a theory cannot adequately explain the nature of accountability and its connection to morality without having to invoke non-relational concepts such as ‘moral obligation, period’ and third-personal reason. In answering this challenge, the paper argues that reflection on the practice of sincere apology reveals that appeal to non-relational concepts such as ‘moral obligation, period’ or third-personal reasons is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to adequately account for the nature of moral accountability. What these reflections show instead is that a relational or bipolar understanding of morality is best equipped to give an adequate explanation of the nature of moral accountability.</p>