<p>Many philosophers who deny moral luck in consequences also affirm that people can be morally responsible for consequences. But this conjunction of views faces a puzzle: because consequences are almost always shaped by luck, how can people be morally responsible for lucky consequences? The solution to which these philosophers appeal is to distinguish between degree and scope of moral responsibility. Although lucky consequences cannot affect how much praise or blame people deserve, people can nevertheless be morally responsible for them. We raise a new problem for this solution. We argue that if a person blames the wrongdoer to the full extent deserved for their action, they cannot justly blame the wrongdoer for the consequence. But that result is functionally equivalent to the view that people are not morally responsible for consequences. In both cases, blame for consequences is inapt. But this counterintuitive result is not implied by the position that resultant moral luck exists, which is a comparative point in the latter view’s favor.</p>