<p><?tk 4?>Moral collectivists argue that certain groups can bear moral responsibility and moral duties. Moral individualists reject this. In this debate, individualists and collectivists both make a common methodological mistake when theorizing about moral agency, responsibility, and blame. Their arguments implicitly assume an all-out primacy of the individual domain. Unless groups can satisfy the <i>exact</i> conditions of our best theory of individual <?tk 4?>moral responsibility, they are not morally responsible entities. I argue <?tk 4?>that none of the plausible arguments justify this all-out primacy. Instead, I defend moderate primacy: (1) We should start our theorizing based on individual cases; and (2) extensional inadequacy for the individual domain is worse than for the group domain. This moderate primacy opens the door for the group domain to play an important role in developing a comprehensive ethical theory. I sketch a directed reflective equilibrium method for systematically including the group domain in our theorizing about moral agency, responsibility, and blame. I further develop <?tk 4?>the Core Features Argument that shows why the collectivist is justified in developing agent-neutral principles <?tk 4?>and moral concepts that apply to individual and group agents alike. Finally, I suggest that the group domain offers the potential for adjudicating debates in ethical theory and exciting new lines of inquiry that could help us better understand the moral phenomena that ethical theory seeks to explain<?tk 4?>.</p>