<p>Aristotle claims that something’s existence could be in some way the cause of a statement’s being true. This claim is clearly at odds with our contemporary understanding of causation because a statement’s being true is not a typical causal relatum. Thus, while some scholars regard this claim as an early version of truthmaking, none of them takes truthmaking to be a case of causation. In this paper, I follow Aristotle’s suggestion and explore in what way truthmaking could be thought of as a case of causation. I develop a power-based account of truthmaking, according to which truthmaking is the mutual manifestation of powers had by a truthmaker and a truth-bearer. Further, I argue that thinking of these powers as causal powers—truthmaking as causation accordingly—helps overcome some challenges faced by non-causal truthmaker theories. Therefore, the power-based account of truthmaking offers an interesting way to think of truthmaking as a case of causation as Aristotle suggests.</p>