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<p>This paper defends the view that logic gives norms for reasoning. This view is often thought to be problematic given that logic is not itself a theory of reasoning and that valid inferences can lead to silly or pointless beliefs. To defend it, I highlight an overlooked distinction between norms for reasoning and norms for belief. With this distinction in hand, I motivate and defend a straightforward account of how logic gives norms for reasoning, showing that it avoids standard objections. I also show that, given some substantive assumptions, we can offer an attractive account of <i>why</i> logic gives norms for reasoning in the way I propose, and of how it is (also) relevant to norms for belief.</p>

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Logic and Norms of Reasoning

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月29日

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  • Conor McHugh

摘要

This paper defends the view that logic gives norms for reasoning. This view is often thought to be problematic given that logic is not itself a theory of reasoning and that valid inferences can lead to silly or pointless beliefs. To defend it, I highlight an overlooked distinction between norms for reasoning and norms for belief. With this distinction in hand, I motivate and defend a straightforward account of how logic gives norms for reasoning, showing that it avoids standard objections. I also show that, given some substantive assumptions, we can offer an attractive account of why logic gives norms for reasoning in the way I propose, and of how it is (also) relevant to norms for belief.