<p>Kripke thought that the meaning paradox articulated in <i>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language</i> arises due to a logical tension. This diagnosis, however, doesn’t account for the enduring controversy surrounding the paradox. I argue that the meaning paradox stems instead from a tension inherent in two conflicting philosophical methodologies: theoretical internalism and theoretical externalism. Internalism, as a philosophical methodology, takes for granted the contents of our minds, whereas externalism takes for granted empirical data and shared notions of common sense. Two of the constraints on a straight solution to the paradox—the Guidance Constraint and the Error Constraint—rely for their plausibility on theoretical internalism and theoretical externalism, respectively. A straight solution thus rests on resolving the tension between these two conflicting philosophical methods. There are, accordingly, two ways to dodge the problem. Kripke’s skeptical solution favors theoretical externalism, but a skeptical solution favoring theoretical internalism is available as well.</p>