Scholarlink

<p>On Walton’s account of make-believe, unknown facts concerning the existence and nature of props can influence fictional truth. Inspired by Lewis’s and Walton’s discussions of import of fictional truth, I explore the shape and tenability of an alternative account that avoids such interference of unknown facts, by making fictional truth rely on participants’ <i>common beliefs</i> about props: conditional principles of generation are only valid if they quantify over props whose existence and nature is common belief between participants of the game of make-believe. I discuss two possible objections to the proposed account that are both based on the intuition that fictional truth should be something that is objective and independent of participants’ mental states.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Common Belief and Make-Believe

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月8日

查看全文
  • Merel Semeijn

摘要

On Walton’s account of make-believe, unknown facts concerning the existence and nature of props can influence fictional truth. Inspired by Lewis’s and Walton’s discussions of import of fictional truth, I explore the shape and tenability of an alternative account that avoids such interference of unknown facts, by making fictional truth rely on participants’ common beliefs about props: conditional principles of generation are only valid if they quantify over props whose existence and nature is common belief between participants of the game of make-believe. I discuss two possible objections to the proposed account that are both based on the intuition that fictional truth should be something that is objective and independent of participants’ mental states.