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<p>Many epistemologists defend the so-called Uniqueness Thesis, according to which no body of evidence permits more than one doxastic attitude. I present two counterexamples to Uniqueness and defend them against objections. The first example involves a case where you know that what you believe determines what is the case, the second a case where you know that the credence you assign to a proposition P determines the objective chance that P. Together with a bridge principle connecting knowledge of whether your doxastic attitudes will be correct and the permissibility of having those attitudes, these cases imply that Uniqueness is false.</p>

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Infinitely Permissive

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月9日

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  • Morten Langfeldt Dahlback

摘要

Many epistemologists defend the so-called Uniqueness Thesis, according to which no body of evidence permits more than one doxastic attitude. I present two counterexamples to Uniqueness and defend them against objections. The first example involves a case where you know that what you believe determines what is the case, the second a case where you know that the credence you assign to a proposition P determines the objective chance that P. Together with a bridge principle connecting knowledge of whether your doxastic attitudes will be correct and the permissibility of having those attitudes, these cases imply that Uniqueness is false.