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<p>The relation of normic support offers a novel solution to the proof paradox: a paradox in evidence law arising from legal cases involving merely statistical evidence (Smith&#xa0;in&#xa0;<i>Mind</i> 127: 1193–1218, 2018). Central to the normic support solution has been the thesis that merely statistical evidence <i>cannot</i> confer normic support. However, it has been observed that there are exceptions to this: there exist cases where merely statistical evidence <i>can</i> give rise to normic support (Blome-Tillmann in <i>Mind</i> 129: 563–578, 2020). If correct, this fact seems to undermine the normic support solution to the proof paradox. This paper explores a resolution: normic support can resolve the proof paradox even though merely statistical evidence sometimes gives rise to normic support. The key to understanding this resolution lies with a source of evidential support that arises out of bodies of evidence that involve <i>character evidence</i> (cf. Colyvan, et al. in <i>JPP</i> 9(2): 168–181 2001). It turns out that character evidence can provide normic support when it is grounded in our knowledge of a certain kind of disposition individuals can have: goal-directed dispositions. The upshot is the recovery of the normic support solution to the puzzle of whether statistical evidence can meet legal standards of proof.</p>

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Legal Standards of Proof: When and Why Merely Statistical Evidence Can Satisfy Them

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月19日

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  • Paul Silva Jr.

摘要

The relation of normic support offers a novel solution to the proof paradox: a paradox in evidence law arising from legal cases involving merely statistical evidence (Smith in Mind 127: 1193–1218, 2018). Central to the normic support solution has been the thesis that merely statistical evidence cannot confer normic support. However, it has been observed that there are exceptions to this: there exist cases where merely statistical evidence can give rise to normic support (Blome-Tillmann in Mind 129: 563–578, 2020). If correct, this fact seems to undermine the normic support solution to the proof paradox. This paper explores a resolution: normic support can resolve the proof paradox even though merely statistical evidence sometimes gives rise to normic support. The key to understanding this resolution lies with a source of evidential support that arises out of bodies of evidence that involve character evidence (cf. Colyvan, et al. in JPP 9(2): 168–181 2001). It turns out that character evidence can provide normic support when it is grounded in our knowledge of a certain kind of disposition individuals can have: goal-directed dispositions. The upshot is the recovery of the normic support solution to the puzzle of whether statistical evidence can meet legal standards of proof.