<p>In light of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality objectives, advancing the green and low-carbon development of cold chain logistics (CCL) for agricultural products is of considerable practical significance. However, research on the coordinated participation of diverse stakeholders in the green and low-carbon transformation (GLCT) in agricultural product CCL is limited. An evolutionary game theory framework is developed in this study to examine the interaction mechanisms and evolutionary trajectories among agricultural product suppliers, CCL enterprises, and the government. The theoretical model is further validated through simulation analysis, and the findings are summarized below: (1) Government subsidies exert a significant incentive effect; however, agricultural product suppliers are more sensitive to subsidies than CCL enterprises, suggesting that the government can adopt differentiated subsidy strategies for different participants. (2) Reducing the costs of green and low-carbon CCL services for agricultural product suppliers and lowering the additional costs of GLCT for CCL enterprises are crucial for increasing participation in the transformation. (3) Moderate competitive pressure can increase the willingness of CCL enterprises to undertake GLCT. (4) Government penalties encourage CCL enterprises to undertake GLCT. By analyzing the interactions and dynamics among CCL enterprises, agricultural product suppliers, and the government, this study offers theoretical implications for promoting GLCT in this industry.</p>