<p>Express packaging waste is becoming the primary component of municipal solid waste and an important trigger to environmental degradation. Accordingly, waste reverse logistics construction is a potentially beneficial means to alleviate the garbage siege issue and extra urban management costs. However, the intricate interactions and random interference of the express packaging waste reverse logistics require research that should not be restricted to static analysis under certain conditions. Accordingly, this study developed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, logistics enterprises, and citizens by integrating white Gaussian noise, and revealed the evolution characteristics by numerical simulation. It is proved that random interference enables players behavior to break through an identified evolutionary path and exerts a non-hindering effect. Although increased subsidies encourage logistics enterprises to be more enthusiastic about reverse logistics construction, local governments are prone to taking weak regulation strategy. Regulatory costs surpassing the threshold drive governments to fluctuate around initial strategy, and restricting the evolution of logistics enterprises through the transmission effect. While enhanced recycling efforts encourage citizens to recycle express packaging waste, the subsequent increase in cost has led logistics enterprises and local governments to evolve negative strategies. It is worth noting that recycling efforts and prices have diminishing effects on citizens’ strategic evolution, indicating that greater recycling inputs fail to translate into equally profitable revenue. This study proposes practical implications for optimizing recycling measures and promoting stakeholders’ cooperation.</p>