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<p>As a high-water-consumption (HWC) industry in China, coal firms need urgent water conservation to tackle water scarcity and sustainability, especially under water cap-and-trading regulations. Current research and practice show that resource-intensive firms prioritize short-term gains yet lack an integrated framework for water-saving production and supply chain operations. Based on Stackelberg game and distribution-free newsvendor models, this paper analyzes robust decisions on water-saving level and coal order quantity under incomplete demand information, and designs a reciprocity altruism joint compensation-based wholesale price contract to mitigate inventory risks and realize coordinated optimization. Key findings are as follows: (1) Downstream firms in the coal supply chain are not passive, and their altruism exerts notable reverse leverage. Coal firms’ reciprocity altruism shapes their expected downstream orders. (2) Water-saving level and coal order quantity do not change monotonically with reciprocity, but are determined by the upstream-downstream relative altruism gap. (3) Inventory compensation correlates positively with contract wholesale price; and reciprocity altruism supports lower-cost coordination. (4) Environmental costs strongly impact water-saving level but barely affect coal order quantity and profits. This study develops a robust decision-making framework under worst-case demand distribution and pioneers the analysis of coal industry water-saving behavior from a supply chain operations perspective.</p>

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Contract coordination of coal supply chain considering reciprocity altruism under water cap-and-trading regulations

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月14日

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  • Peiyao Wang,
  • Pu Dong,
  • Long Zhang,
  • Yan Li,
  • Peishan Fan,
  • Xiaofan Li,
  • Chaowei Wang

摘要

As a high-water-consumption (HWC) industry in China, coal firms need urgent water conservation to tackle water scarcity and sustainability, especially under water cap-and-trading regulations. Current research and practice show that resource-intensive firms prioritize short-term gains yet lack an integrated framework for water-saving production and supply chain operations. Based on Stackelberg game and distribution-free newsvendor models, this paper analyzes robust decisions on water-saving level and coal order quantity under incomplete demand information, and designs a reciprocity altruism joint compensation-based wholesale price contract to mitigate inventory risks and realize coordinated optimization. Key findings are as follows: (1) Downstream firms in the coal supply chain are not passive, and their altruism exerts notable reverse leverage. Coal firms’ reciprocity altruism shapes their expected downstream orders. (2) Water-saving level and coal order quantity do not change monotonically with reciprocity, but are determined by the upstream-downstream relative altruism gap. (3) Inventory compensation correlates positively with contract wholesale price; and reciprocity altruism supports lower-cost coordination. (4) Environmental costs strongly impact water-saving level but barely affect coal order quantity and profits. This study develops a robust decision-making framework under worst-case demand distribution and pioneers the analysis of coal industry water-saving behavior from a supply chain operations perspective.