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<p>To address the uncertainty of renewable energy power generation, enterprises use ES to smooth out power generation fluctuations. However, the high requirements for the integration of green electricity have an impact on the storage methods of power generation enterprises, and the cross-regional nature of storage may exacerbate the vicious competition among local governments. Under the heterogeneity of regional government subsidies, it is urgent to promote energy storage (ES) in power generation enterprises and avoid vicious competition. In this context, this paper introduces the Stackelberg game among power generation enterprises into the complex network evolutionary dynamics analysis framework. It precisely depicts the impact of the power grid’s stable power generation preference on the ES decisions of power generation enterprises under heterogeneous government subsidies. The results of this paper indicate: (1) The power grid’s stable power generation preference can promote the configuration of ES, the improvement of the price of new energy power (NEP) in the market, the level of power generation stability, and total welfare of the market society. (2) "Stable power generation subsidy" can stimulate power generation enterprises to jointly construction ES facilities, while "ES cost subsidy" promotes their leasing of ES capacity. (3) The central government is able to adjust the intensity of subsidies to promote regional governments to adopt consistent subsidy methods to avoid vicious competition. The government needs to balance " power generation stability " target and " social welfare" target to formulate subsidy strategies.</p>

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Research on energy storage decision-making of power generation enterprises under government heterogeneous subsidies in complex network environments

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月23日

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  • Zhen Xu,
  • Xinping Wang,
  • Chang Su

摘要

To address the uncertainty of renewable energy power generation, enterprises use ES to smooth out power generation fluctuations. However, the high requirements for the integration of green electricity have an impact on the storage methods of power generation enterprises, and the cross-regional nature of storage may exacerbate the vicious competition among local governments. Under the heterogeneity of regional government subsidies, it is urgent to promote energy storage (ES) in power generation enterprises and avoid vicious competition. In this context, this paper introduces the Stackelberg game among power generation enterprises into the complex network evolutionary dynamics analysis framework. It precisely depicts the impact of the power grid’s stable power generation preference on the ES decisions of power generation enterprises under heterogeneous government subsidies. The results of this paper indicate: (1) The power grid’s stable power generation preference can promote the configuration of ES, the improvement of the price of new energy power (NEP) in the market, the level of power generation stability, and total welfare of the market society. (2) "Stable power generation subsidy" can stimulate power generation enterprises to jointly construction ES facilities, while "ES cost subsidy" promotes their leasing of ES capacity. (3) The central government is able to adjust the intensity of subsidies to promote regional governments to adopt consistent subsidy methods to avoid vicious competition. The government needs to balance " power generation stability " target and " social welfare" target to formulate subsidy strategies.