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<p>The systemic and multifaceted nature of sources contributing to coastal pollution highlights the need for intergovernmental collaborative governance to address the degradation of coastal ecosystems. Clarifying the inherent logic of this governance is crucial for achieving high-quality development in managing coastal ecosystems. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes the basic assumptions of intergovernmental collaborative governance for coastal ecosystem degradation from the perspective of land-sea coordination and constructs an evolutionary game model involving coastal and inland local governments, considering the constraints imposed by the provincial government. On this basis, a numerical simulation analysis using an agent-based model (ABM) explores the mechanism influence of important parameters, such as the initial willingness of participating agents, the provincial government’s punishment and reward intensity, the government’s green performance evaluation intensity, and collaborative governance transaction costs, on the system’s evolutionary trajectory. The research conclusions are as follows: ➀ Increasing the initial regulatory willingness of both coastal and inland local governments promotes the adoption of proactive collaborative governance strategies. ➁ Raising the provincial government’s punishment intensity and green performance evaluation intensity can effectively promote intergovernmental collaborative governance of coastal ecosystem degradation. Among them, inland local governments are more likely than coastal ones to adopt proactive strategies under intense green performance evaluations. ➂ Excessively high or low rewards provided by the provincial government for achieving collaborative governance hinder the system’s evolution toward effective collaboration. ➃ Higher transaction costs of collaborative governance reduce the likelihood that coastal and inland local governments will engage proactively in collaboration. Based on these findings, this paper recommends enhancing supervision and inspection mechanisms, advancing the implementation of collaborative governance policies, establishing a balanced reward-and-punishment system at the provincial level, refining the performance evaluation system for local governments, and effectively reducing the transaction costs associated with collaborative governance.</p>

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Evolutionary game analysis of intergovernmental collaborative governance of coastal ecosystems degradation from a land-sea coordination perspective

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月16日

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  • Hanxiao Xu,
  • Tongze Liu,
  • Xiaoxin Zhu,
  • Wenlong Zhu

摘要

The systemic and multifaceted nature of sources contributing to coastal pollution highlights the need for intergovernmental collaborative governance to address the degradation of coastal ecosystems. Clarifying the inherent logic of this governance is crucial for achieving high-quality development in managing coastal ecosystems. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes the basic assumptions of intergovernmental collaborative governance for coastal ecosystem degradation from the perspective of land-sea coordination and constructs an evolutionary game model involving coastal and inland local governments, considering the constraints imposed by the provincial government. On this basis, a numerical simulation analysis using an agent-based model (ABM) explores the mechanism influence of important parameters, such as the initial willingness of participating agents, the provincial government’s punishment and reward intensity, the government’s green performance evaluation intensity, and collaborative governance transaction costs, on the system’s evolutionary trajectory. The research conclusions are as follows: ➀ Increasing the initial regulatory willingness of both coastal and inland local governments promotes the adoption of proactive collaborative governance strategies. ➁ Raising the provincial government’s punishment intensity and green performance evaluation intensity can effectively promote intergovernmental collaborative governance of coastal ecosystem degradation. Among them, inland local governments are more likely than coastal ones to adopt proactive strategies under intense green performance evaluations. ➂ Excessively high or low rewards provided by the provincial government for achieving collaborative governance hinder the system’s evolution toward effective collaboration. ➃ Higher transaction costs of collaborative governance reduce the likelihood that coastal and inland local governments will engage proactively in collaboration. Based on these findings, this paper recommends enhancing supervision and inspection mechanisms, advancing the implementation of collaborative governance policies, establishing a balanced reward-and-punishment system at the provincial level, refining the performance evaluation system for local governments, and effectively reducing the transaction costs associated with collaborative governance.