Time-inconsistent hybrid policy of carbon tax and carbon emission trading with corporate social responsibility
摘要
This paper proposes a three-stage game model to analyze the time-inconsistency of emission policy design in a duopoly market. The model incorporates firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) and investigates two hybrid policy instruments: the ex-ante carbon tax with ETS (EAT) and the ex-post carbon tax with ETS (EPT). Our results demonstrate that both hybrid policies are effective. Under a stringent emission cap (1% of baseline emissions), both EAT and EPT policies drive a 99% reduction in total emissions, which confirms that the policies provide a viable pathway for the government to achieve phased and overarching emission reduction targets. Compared with EPT, the EAT hybrid policy has a higher carbon tax rate, reflecting the government’s concern over market risks and uncertainties. There is a symbiotic dynamic relationship between the clearing permit price of the emission trading market and the optimal ex-ante and ex-post taxes, in which CSR amplifies the effectiveness of emission reduction policies. The rise of CSR will increase the optimal carbon tax for the whole society and improve social welfare. For specific recommendations for policymakers, the policy choice depends on the priority of policy goals, while encouraging CSR is consistent with the emission reduction targets.