<p>The environmental problem caused by carbon emission has driven the carbon market to regulate enterprises’ carbon emission reduction, thereby affecting enterprises’ carbon emission reduction effort and low-carbon publicity effort. Under this market regulation, the revenue models among enterprises further affecting their low-carbon decisions. Therefore, in order to explore the dynamic changes of low-carbon decisions made by enterprises under such dual pressures, this study uses differential game to explore a dual-channel carbon emission reduction model composed of a manufacturer and a retailer: without market regulation and non-revenue sharing, with market regulation and non-revenue sharing, without market regulation and revenue sharing, and with market regulation and revenue sharing. Further analysis the enterprises’ profits change, the impact of channel preference and channel greenness. The results show: (1) market regulation benefits the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction effort, and not affecting the retailer’s low-carbon publicity effort, but it is beneficial to their profits. In most cases, revenue sharing is not conducive to their decisions and profits. Moreover, there is a possibility that the manufacturer may share online revenue with the retailer. (2) In most cases, the manufacturer and the retailer prefer a model that is with market regulation and non-revenue sharing. (3) The channel greenness will promote the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction effort. The online channel greenness will not hinder the retailer’s low-carbon publicity effort, but it will impact its profit. For the manufacturer, in non-revenue sharing (revenue sharing) model, the impact of channel greenness (channel preference) is greater. For the retailer, channel preferences always have a greater impact.</p>