Collection strategy in a remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain considering retailer competition
摘要
This paper investigates the strategic choice of collection channels within a remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) comprising a strong manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We construct three recycling models in the reverse channel: Manufacturer-managed (MM), Retailer-retailer Competitive (RR), and Manufacturer-retailer Competitive (MR) collection systems. The impact of key parameters, such as price competition in the forward channel and collection competition in the reverse channel under different recycling modes are analyzed. Finally, we take HP printer cartridges as a case for simulation analysis, exploring the optimal recycling mode of enterprises from various perspectives. The results show that: (i) moderate price competition among retailers enhances profitability for both manufacturers and retailers, while simultaneously stimulating product recycling; (ii) the manufacturer can obtain greater recycling benefits and less profit loss by authorizing part of the collection business to retailers when the manufacturing cost is high; (iii) competition among enterprises in the reverse channel is always not conducive to product recycling and enterprise income. When inter-retailer collection competition is intense while manufacturer-retailer competition is low, the manufacturer should delegate the collection business to retailers; conversely, the collection business should be fully authorized to retailers; If the collection competition among enterprises is high, the manufacturer should handle the collection itself.