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<p>As carbon emission trading systems evolve, understanding the strategic interactions between regional governments and firms in emission reduction is crucial, especially given the constraints on subsidies and public investments. This study investigates the emission control strategies between government and corporations within the framework of carbon emissions trading using a Stackelberg differential game framework. By formulating the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, the analysis explores both cooperative and non-cooperative policy scenarios through the lens of dynamic planning. The research examines how governmental policies influence enterprise-level emission reduction decisions, particularly in response to subsidies and public resource allocation. Results show that, regardless of cooperation, emission reduction levels tend to decline over time due to limited subsidies and public investment. However, under cooperative governance, both subsidies and enterprise incentives are significantly higher compared to non-cooperative scenarios. For enterprises, the decision to reduce emissions depends on both their investment in R&amp;D and the level of governmental support. A decrease in subsidies raises the effective cost of emission reduction, thereby lowering equilibrium levels. Furthermore, higher R&amp;D costs discourage firms from pursuing emission reductions, while increased environmental damage from pollutants motivates greater governmental subsidies to support enterprise innovation and mitigation efforts. Our findings provide a scientific basis for differentiated carbon control strategies, informing policy initiatives for China’s dual carbon goals.</p>

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A differential game model of emission reduction by government and enterprises in the context of carbon emission trading

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月10日

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  • Minmin Teng,
  • Dandan Ji,
  • Chuanfeng Han,
  • Pihui Liu

摘要

As carbon emission trading systems evolve, understanding the strategic interactions between regional governments and firms in emission reduction is crucial, especially given the constraints on subsidies and public investments. This study investigates the emission control strategies between government and corporations within the framework of carbon emissions trading using a Stackelberg differential game framework. By formulating the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, the analysis explores both cooperative and non-cooperative policy scenarios through the lens of dynamic planning. The research examines how governmental policies influence enterprise-level emission reduction decisions, particularly in response to subsidies and public resource allocation. Results show that, regardless of cooperation, emission reduction levels tend to decline over time due to limited subsidies and public investment. However, under cooperative governance, both subsidies and enterprise incentives are significantly higher compared to non-cooperative scenarios. For enterprises, the decision to reduce emissions depends on both their investment in R&D and the level of governmental support. A decrease in subsidies raises the effective cost of emission reduction, thereby lowering equilibrium levels. Furthermore, higher R&D costs discourage firms from pursuing emission reductions, while increased environmental damage from pollutants motivates greater governmental subsidies to support enterprise innovation and mitigation efforts. Our findings provide a scientific basis for differentiated carbon control strategies, informing policy initiatives for China’s dual carbon goals.